This paper considers the effects of buyer power under the antitrust laws. It focuses on EU antitrust law, namely Article 102 TFEU and the EU Merger Control Regulation, while taking into account the stance of US antitrust law. Recent investigations of several European antitrust authorities in the grocery sector have expressed concerns that concentration on the demand side can result in market foreclosure or anticompetitive exploitation of market participants. Also, in the US there is an ongoing debate about the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of buyer power, which is inter alia reflected in the landmark decision of the US Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser and in the merger control policies of the DOJ and the FTC. Against this background, the present paper starts with the definition of buyer power. It underscores the necessity to distinguish between single price monopsony on the one hand and individual bargaining power on the other hand, since the economic effects of these two types of buyer power deviate significantly. In subsequent steps, the paper analyses different theories of harm that can be raised with respect to buyer power. It discusses the effects of buyer power on allocative efficiency, dynamic efficiency as well as consumer welfare and draws conclusions from that for the enforcement of the antitrust laws.
I. Introduction
The notion of markets implies that there is at least one seller and one buyer. Since competition law aims at keeping markets open in order to protect the competitive process and ultimately serve the benefits of consumers it is therefore acknowledged that both the supply and the demand side of markets are subject to the antitrust laws. Already in 1905 the US Supreme
Court applied the Sherman Act in cases involving buyer power created through conspiracies, which aimed at suppressing input prices. 1 Although Section 2 of the Sherman Act only talks about monopolisation and makes no mention of monopsony, the US Supreme Court has acknowledged that it comprises both, monopoly and buyer power, the latter often referred to as monopsony power. 2 The reason for Section 2 not using both terms is of a historic nature since in the economic models being discussed around 1890 monopsony did not play a prominent role. 3 Nonetheless, in the debates in both houses of the US Congress in 1890
concern was expressed towards both market power on the demand and on the supply side. 4 Also Article 102 TFEU relates to both. That becomes obvious in its Sentence 2 lit. a, which prohibits in equal measure the imposition of "unfair purchase or selling prices". The merger control laws of the Clayton Act and the European Merger Control Regulation (EUMR) similarly relate to lessenings/impediments of/to (effective) competition in supply or demand markets.
The problem with the application of the antitrust laws on the buyer side is that the effects of high market concentration are much more complex than on the supply side. 5 While monopoly power generally gives rise to unilateral price increases directly, the impact of buyer power is ambiguous: A position of strength in a demand market can reduce the prices for an input good. Such a cost reduction can then result in lower prices in a downstream market and therefore ultimately benefit consumers. At the same time a cost reduction achieved by a dominant purchaser may also serve as an instrument to rise rivals costs and thereby foreclose an input market. This can create a position of strength on a downstream distribution market, which might ultimately result in price increases. These initial thoughts already demonstrate that it is hardly possible to condemn buyer power as per se anticompetitive on the one hand or praise it as per se efficient on the other.
The analysis of buyer power is not only challenging from an economic perspective. Moreover, this particular subject raises legal questions with respect to the objectives of antitrust law. Is it the purpose of the antitrust laws to protect social welfare or is it tailored more narrowly to safeguard the welfare of end-consumers? Are suppliers protected in the same way against monopsony as are consumers against monopoly? Is there such a thing as "supplier welfare"? Some of the enforcers are afraid that a high concentration on the demand side can result in market foreclosure or anticompetitive exploitation of market participants. In this context, attention should inter alia be paid to the grocery-sector inquiries by the UK Competition Commission of 2008 and the German Bundeskartellamt of 2014. The authorities have found reasons to be concerned with a high concentration of buyer power among large food retail companies. It was alleged that despite resulting in lower input prices for groceries, the high concentration on the demand side could ultimately harm consumers or at least the suppliers.
Buyer power could hamper innovation on the supply side 17 or increase market power in downstream markets.
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Against this background it is the purpose of the present article and to determine in which way the antitrust laws should react to the different economic effects that can arise from buyer power. As to the legal side, the focus will rest on the EU law of abuses against dominance (Article 102 TFEU) and EU merger control, while references will be made to the US decisional practice concerning the Clayton Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 19 The cartel prohibition will not be part of this analysis. 17 UK Competition Commission, The supply of groceries in the UK, supra note 15 at 10.5. 18 Bundeskartellamt, Sektoruntersuchung Lebensmitteleinzelhandel, supra note 16, p. 407. 19 The Robinson-Patman Act must also be mentioned for the sake of completeness since it prohibits anticompetitive price discrimination. Yet it does not seem to have a huge relevance in US antitrust practice these When dealing with buyer power under the antitrust laws from a legal perspective, it is appropriate to distinguish between the definition of buyer power on the one hand and its effects on the other. The article therefore starts with the definitional issue (under Section II.).
The procompetitive and anticompetitive effects potentially arising from buyer power will be discussed subsequently. Here, it will be necessary to draw further distinctions. Buyer power in an input market can serve as an instrument to exclude competitors from the downstream distribution market. From this angle, buyer power is merely part of the analysis of supplier power in the downstream market. The issues arising in this context form the second part of this article (under Section III.). Moreover, buyer power can be examined for other negative effects beyond simply the opportunity to exclude downstream rivals. This namely concerns the question whether the antitrust laws should protect suppliers as such against the extraction of price reductions through powerful buyers (under Section IV.).
II. The definition of buyer power
A variety of definitions of buyer power exist. Some describe it as the ability to significantly influence the terms of a purchase for reasons other than efficiency. 20 Blair and Harrison have suggested a "buying power index" in order to measure the degree of buyer power. The index shall be based on the market share of the buyer; the elasticity of supply; and the elasticity of fringe demand. 21 This index, however, is considered by some not to be an ideal tool for practical case analysis, since it is held to be very difficult to precisely measure elasticity of supply and of fringe demand. 22 The OECD has considered buyer power to be tantamount to "the ability of a buyer to negotiate a favorable price that is nevertheless above the competitive level." 23 The problem of such definitions is that they aim at describing one single phenomenon. There is not one type of buyer power, though. There are in fact two types which days. Private plaintiffs sometimes bring suits alleging illegal price discrimination. For example, volume discounts offered by a seller (or demanded by a buyer) could be deemed illegal if the defendant does not offer similar terms to other buyers and is unable to establish that it satisfies one of the affirmative defenses under the Robinson-Patman Act. 20 Grimes, supra note 1, at 565. are different in their prerequisites as well as in their effects on economy: (1) the classical single price monopsony, and (2) buyer power that is based on bargaining power.
In the classical monopsony theory, all purchasers in the relevant market pay the same price. If a full monopsony exists, there is by definition only one buyer. Consequently, buyer power means that the monopsonist can obtain a lower price by a reduction in purchase quantity. 24 In this model, monopsony power is simply the mirror image of monopoly power. 25 A monopolist increases market price by restricting output, while the monopsonist reduces market price by reducing demand. 26 Yet, this model can even work where smaller rivals exist alongside a strong buyer. They would act as price takers and profit from a lower market price achieved by the de-facto monopsonist through a reduction in quantity.
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However, modern antitrust economics, as well as real world economics, show that price reductions in input markets often do not follow the classical single-price monopsony model.
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Supply can be so inelastic that a powerful buyer can extract discounts not justified by cost without reducing the quantity of its purchases at all. 29 In these cases the competitive process in the market takes place in bilateral negotiations in which supplier and buyer negotiate individually over prices and quantities. Through these negotiations, the buyer and supplier agree on individual prices and conditions that differ from those offered to other parties. 30 Each contract implies a joint profit for supplier and buyer, and the split of the profit depends on the bargaining power of each side. Buyers with market power can make "all or nothing" offers for the same or even a larger quantity at a lower price per unit or -as the alternative -threaten with the termination of any purchases from the particular seller. 27 This is an upside-down version of the umbrella effect which takes place in a supply market where a strong seller increases prices through a reduction of his output. In this scenario the smaller rivals will profit from the price increase on the market. 28 Bundeskartellamt, Buyer Power in Competition Law, supra note 5, p. 2. 29 Grimes, supra note 1, at 567. Bargaining power is often found to exist at significantly lower market shares than it is generally assumed with respect to market power on the seller side. As to the market shares on the demand side, the EU-Commission has decided that in procurement markets for grocery stores an average share of 22% of the turnover with a given buyer suffices to make him indispensable for a supplier. 37 Others argue that even powerful brand owners may depend on a retail chain with 10% market share. 38 Scholarship teaches that large size in terms of market shares is neither necessary nor sufficient for bargaining power to exist.
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Some authors point out that the functional differences between single-price monopsony on the one hand and bargaining power on the other are so fundamental that this should also be reflected in the terminology. The notion of "monopsony" or "monopsony power" should only be used for the classical single-price monopsony. In contrast, a position of strength based on bargaining power should exclusively be referred to as "buyer power". 40 Many other authors, however, use the words monopsony and buyer power synonymously. 41 The terminological approach in this article will be the following: "Buyer power" shall be the generic term for Moreover, it must be considered that both bargaining power and monopsony power are phenomena that vary in their intensities just as it is the case with market power on the supply side. Consequently, it would be an unwise effort to try to define certain market share thresholds that justify in themselves an antitrust intervention. 43 Rather, an economic approach to buyer power must assess the effects that buyer power can have on upstream or downstream competition and ultimately the consumer. The finding of market dominance in the meaning of Article 102 TFEU or Article 2 EUMR should consequently depend on whether the particular degree of buyer power gives rise to competitive harm. The analysis of buyer power therefore must not be detached from the assessment of the effects of such power.
III. Exclusionary effect on a downstream market

Preliminary remarks
As to the effects that buyer power can have on competition, this article will first focus on the potential for excluding rivals in a downstream market. Bargaining power can give the opportunity to achieve competitive advantages over smaller rivals in the input market which can pay out as an increase in strength downstream through a foreclosure of the input market.
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Increased buyer power can reduce the powerful purchaser's input costs so that in relation to him his rival's costs are higher. This can allow the purchaser to transfer buyer power to subsequent supply markets. Such an effect can give rise to competitive concerns since it increases market power in the subsequent supply market and can therefore ultimately harm consumers through increased prices. Such an outcome reduces social welfare as well as endconsumer welfare so that there is a basic consensus in the antitrust orders of the European Union and the United States that the laws against abusive unilateral conduct/monopolisation conduct as well as merger control laws must be concerned with such implications of buyer power. The question is, however, under which circumstances a concentration on the demand side might have such an effect on the downstream market. Different constellations must be distinguished.
Rising rivals' costs a) Waterbed and spiral-effect
If the market share of a particular player on the demand side is higher than that of its rivals, this can result in better prices and conditions in the upstream market. 45 customer. 48 It could possibly be argued that a supplier facing price reductions in relation to a particular strong purchaser can try to compensate for the losses by increasing prices with respect to smaller buyers of the relevant input. If such an effect actually took place, an increase in buyer power could directly rise rivals' costs. It is questionable, though, whether a waterbed effect of this simple form is a realistic scenario. If a supplier has the power to increase prices vis-à-vis smaller buyers, it remains unclear why such power should only be used after a dominant buyer has exacted a price reduction. Rather, the supplier should have tried to achieve the highest possible price from smaller purchasers independent of the outcome of the negotiations with the powerful buyer. 49 However, buyer power can result in upstream price discrimination due to a decrease in demand of smaller rivals. The larger the quantity that a buyer purchases from a certain input, the lower the price will often be. This is due to economies of scale on the supply side. Smaller rivals in the input market therefore face relatively higher costs. If the strong purchaser passes on such cost reduction to subsequent consumers, he can increase his output in the downstream market. Since his competitor's output reduces, the smaller rivals will have a lower demand in the supply market. That can further worsen their conditions compared to those offered to the mighty buyer namely due to the loss of economies of scale and through a decrease of bargaining power, the latter being based on the fact that they become less viable outside options for the supplier. 50 This type of waterbed effect can therefore be explained by a so called "spiral effect". The EU Commission has acknowledged in its merger control decision practice that such spiral effect can take place. 51 The increase of a firm's share on the demand side will increase its downward output due to lower input costs, which will in turn further boost its demand in the input market etc.
So, how should the antitrust laws deal with it? 48 The UK Competition Commission uses the following definition with respect to groceries: "A waterbed effect occurs when, as a result of large grocery retailers obtaining lower prices from their suppliers, these suppliers increase prices for other grocery retailers and wholesalers.", UK Competition Commission, The supply of groceries in the UK market investigation, supra note 15, at 5.19 footnote 1. 
b) Implications for merger control
As far as merger control law is concerned, the relevant question is whether such a spiral effect can amount to a significant impediment to effective competition, namely by creating or strengthening a position that gives rise to unilateral price increases in the downstream market 52 and which would have to be considered a loss of social and end-consumer welfare.
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If the merged entity already holds a strong position in the downstream market, an increase in buyer power can reinforce this. Therefore, the European Commission has for example in the REWE/Meinl merger held that the dominant position to which the operation would give rise in the procurement market for grocery goods would award the merged entity with a considerable competitive advantage in the downstream distribution market. The Commission only cleared the merger subject to remedies and inter alia relied on the argument that the operation would place the merged entity in a dominant position in the food-retail market in Austria.
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The theory of harm based on the aforementioned arguments relies on efficiencies. By reducing his own input cost the powerful buyer has a lever to reduce purchase quantity of his rivals and thereby increase their input costs in relation to him. This leads to the well-known question of whether efficiencies created through a merger can be invoked against the transaction. Such a view might ultimately lead to a so-called "efficiency offense". It is not the purpose of this article to enter into the fundamental debate of whether and to what extent efficiencies must be considered in the field of merger control and whether an efficiency offense is a bad thing or not. For the present context it suffices to say that, in the first instance, upstream efficiencies in the form of lower input costs can have an effect on downstream markets and that, secondly, the quality of such effects is a matter of proximity and degree:
Although a spiral effect can take place, it cannot be said that superior bargaining power in an input market always leads to foreclosure and downstream monopolisation. Rather, this depends on the competitive environment in both the upstream and the downstream market. A powerful buyer can face serious competition in a downstream market. 55 That can be the case e.g. where the geographic scope of the input market is narrower than that of the downstream 52 Potential effects on the upstream input market will be dealt with later under IV. 53 Bundeskartellamt, Buyer Power in Competition Law, supra note 5, p. 3. What is more, the risk of downstream monopolisation depends on the barriers of entry. If they are high, downstream monopolisation will be more difficult to tackle in the future. The grocery sector, for example, has traditionally been 57 linked to significant entry barriers, e.g. in the form of investments in infrastructure, advertising sunk costs and so on. The risks of a long-lasting downstream monopolisation might therefore be higher in this sector than it could be, for example, where virtual market platforms are at stake -like on internet sales websitesso that new competitors can gain market shares more easily by way of innovation and better service quality. However, even in virtual markets can barriers to entry exist, namely where two sided markets and network externalities play a role. focus on upscale food products will create more pressure on input suppliers than a combination of an upscale retailer with a low-cost grocery company.
c) Implications for abuse of dominance cases
A position of strength in a demand market cannot only be achieved by merger but also come from organic growth. If buyer power exists, the question comes up whether price discrimination in the aforementioned sense can be objectionable under the laws against abuses of dominance or against monopolisation. Such a view was for example taken by the US government many years ago in the A&P case. A&P and its officers were held to have violated the antitrust laws "by oppressing competitors through the abuse of the defendants' mass buying and selling power" 59 . The government asserted that the lower input prices achieved by A&P had enabled it to charge lower retail prices in the downstream market so that competitors were driven out of business which had increased A&P's market share. 63 Some authors are of the view that such "take it or leave it-offers" extracting greater price concessions than were justified by cost should not be banned. 64 They assert that such an exertion of buyer power does not create anticompetitive effects that lessen social-or consumer-welfare. Making a "take it or leave it-offer" implied that the dominant purchaser offered to buy the same or even larger quantity, only at a lower price. 65 Based on that assumption, the exertion of buyer power only made for a rent shifting from the supplier to the purchaser without any output reduction. 63 This relates to more than, for example, cost reductions created by economies of scale due to larger purchase volumes would justify. 64 Noll, supra note 31, at 622 et seq. 65 Grimes, supra note 1, at 567.
Buying the same quantity at a lower price only meant that the supplier's margins were reduced to the benefit of the direct purchaser, while the latter received the same for paying less. A mere rent shifting, however, should not be an issue of the antitrust laws, so that there were no reasons to object such a conduct according to this view. 66 Yet, although the direct effect of such "take it or leave it offers" is only a rent shifting without any output reduction, it is questionable whether this means that the economic effects of such conduct are actually neutral with respect to social or end-consumer welfare. be an important element of dynamic competition and is therefore not per se inefficient.
Bargaining power reflects a reduction in viable outside options for a supplier. The reason for a decrease in outside options can be a reduction in quality or a lack of innovation by a particular supplier. 67 In such a case it must be objectively justified for a dominant purchaser to make use of superior bargaining power created by the conduct of the supplier and pay lower prices, since lower input quality will decrease his performance in the downstream distribution market. Moreover, an increase in bargaining power of the buyer can be a result of downstream investments of this buyer. Such could be the case where the purchaser has invested heavily in advertising in the downstream market so that he becomes a more attractive sales partner for the suppliers. In such a scenario it would not be convincing to consider any reduction in price abusive if it does not merely reflect economies of scale created upstream. Such an antitrust policy could eliminate incentives for downstream innovation. Any finding of abusively low prices therefore requires an in depth analysis of the reasons for the creation of the bargaining power that is exerted. Only if bargaining power is used to rise rival's cost without any 66 Noll, supra note 31, at 622 et seq. 67 See with reference to the ambiguous relationship between innovation and bargaining power IV.3.b).
justification of the kind mentioned above, this can be qualified as being part of a strategy of inefficient exclusion and therefore abusive.
Other types of exclusionary conduct
It goes without saying that a position of dominance in a demand market can give rise to other types of exclusionary abuses aimed at an increase of market power on downstream supply markets. That would be the case, for example, when a dominant purchaser imposed on its Even with respect to the law against abuses of dominance, welfare issues are not irrelevant.
There can be constellations in which it is unclear whether a particular conduct is exclusionary or exploitative in terms of Article 102 TFEU. In order to exemplify that, we might think of a powerful buyer that is exposed to fierce downstream competition. Price concessions extracted from the suppliers would be passed on to consumers. Can the exertion of buyer power nonetheless be considered abusive in terms of Article 102 TFEU? The answer to this question should also be guided by the analysis of welfare gains and losses created through such a conduct.
Allocative efficiency (deadweight loss)
Monopsony pricing in the single-price monopsony model as described in section II of this article can create a deadweight loss and therefore result in allocative inefficiency. 71 A lower price in the monopsonised market is achieved by reducing the demand so that the prices fall.
Since in this constellation the output is reduced below the competitive level, the outcome is a deadweight loss, as the equilibrium for the monopsonised good is not achieved. effect on society the monopsony creates a loss of efficiency and welfare, because wealth is redistributed to the buyers of the monopsonised good.
If it were the purpose of the antitrust laws to maximize welfare in terms of allocative efficiency, it could be argued that such an effect should be prohibited. Robert Bork is the most prominent antitrust writer claiming in his book "The Antitrust Paradox" from 1978 that allocative efficiency should be a goal of any antitrust policy. He wrote 72 : "...productive efficiency, the single most important factor contributing to that welfare must be given due weight along with allocative efficiency." In a single-price monopsony case, the creation or strengthening of monopsony power would therefore have to be considered anticompetitive irrespective of whether the transaction has a potential for an input foreclosure to the detriment of downstream rivals or not. The output reduction would result in a deadweight loss, creating a lessening of allocative efficiency which would justify an antitrust intervention in itself.
Some argue, however, that allocative efficiency -or more generally speaking: social or aggregate welfare -is not an appropriate standard for antitrust law application. 73 They put
forward that the antitrust laws should rather be concerned with "consumer welfare".
According to them, consumer harm should be interpreted as to relate only to the end user of the particular good. The notion of allocative efficiency/social welfare/total welfare is considered by them to be rather a theoretical matter yet impractical as a theory for real world application of antirust law. 73 Sceptical about social welfare as the benchmark for competition law application see Bundeskartellamt, Buyer Power in Competition Law, supra note 5, p. 13 ("One of the questions raised here is whether the term consumer means only the end consumer on the downstream market or whether ultimately the long-term well-being of all is at stake (aggregated welfare). Understood in the latter meaning the term consumer welfare attains such a level of abstraction that it can well be used as an overall concept but not as a standard for deciding specific cases.") (emphasis original); Rosch, supra note 55, at 2. 74 Rosch, supra note 55, at 6. 75 Id. at 7.
allocative efficiency and consumer welfare would actually be decisive for the antitrust assessment of the above mentioned single-price monopsony case. 76 Since the exercise of monopsony power would result in a reduction of output on a level less than the societal optimum, the conduct would create a capacity restriction also with respect to subsequent downstream markets. This can in turn have a price increasing effect and therefore ultimatelyalso -harm end consumers. Such reference to consumer harm created by output restrictions is exactly the approach of the EU-Commission in its Horizontal Merger Guidelines with respect to monopsony cases. he consumer welfare and total welfare standards can diverge, although I think it is a rare case in practice.").
77 EU Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, Official Journal C 031 , 05/02/2004 P. 5, para. 61 ("The merged firm may be in a position to obtain lower prices by reducing its purchase of inputs. This may, in turn, lead it also to lower its level of output in the final product market, and thus harm consumer welfare") (footnote omitted). 78 Bundeskartellamt, Buyer Power in Competition Law, supra note 5, p. 3.
Effects on suppliers' revenues a) Protection of suppliers' revenues as a goal of antitrust policy?
Buyer power reduces input prices, while monopoly power increases output prices. This symmetry could be seen as a reason to treat both phenomena in an analogous way. In supply markets, the creation of an upward pricing pressure is deemed to constitute a significant impediment to effective competition 79 , and an exploitation of customers is considered illegal under Article 102 TFEU. 80 Hence, the same might be true for a "downward pricing pressure" in a demand market depriving suppliers of a portion of their revenues. In both contexts the exertion of market power creates losses for the other party. Such an equation of seller power and buyer power would make sense if it could be assumed that buyers and sellers are protected equally by the antitrust laws. If that were found to be true, the mere threat of a price cut to the detriment of sellers would suffice to block a merger and the mere extraction of a significantly lower price through a dominant buyer might be considered an exploitative abuse of dominance, without the need to demonstrate any foreclosure effect or any loss of social or consumer welfare. From this perspective, the antitrust laws would grant to the sellers a legitimate interest in prices which shall not be "artificially" low.
Until today, the highest courts in Europe and the United States 81 have left open as to whether the antitrust laws recognize and protect such an interest of suppliers in decent, fair and sufficiently high prices for their products. In CICCE 82 the ECJ dismissed an action concerning an allegedly abusive conduct but recognized that the extraction of excessively low prices could in principle amount to an abuse. The Court made a few incidental observations in this respect indicating that the "economic value" of the particular good might be relevant to determine whether the purchase price was excessively low. The ECJ, though, did not provide with a comprehensive theory on the rationale behind such a potential abuse of buyer power. 86 For its theory of harm the government relied on the argument that the merger would result in lower input prices and therefore deprive the suppliers of a portion of their revenues.
The DOJ did not, however, argue further that this outcome would do harm to social or consumer welfare. In its complaint, the government merely stated that the transaction would "likely result in reduced competition, with likely effects including depressed prices paid and less attractive contract terms offered to farmers." 87 Moreover, it was argued in the complaint that in the past farmers had benefitted from competition between the merging parties as purchasers. 88 Since the transaction would reduce outside options for the farmers, they could not switch or threaten to switch to another buyer "when any of the terms of his or her contract deteriorate" so that "he or she would likely chose to accept inferior terms rather than to have no contract at all." 89 The DOJ therefore found the transaction likely to "force growers to 83 of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Art. 101 TFEU is hardly suitable to answer the question of whether it is the purpose of the antitrust laws to prohibit such a thing as "supplier harm".
Moreover, the antitrust laws lack any standard for the definition of "supplier harm". It is unclear how the price of a certain good can be determined to be appropriate, just, fair, or sufficiently high in order not to "harm" the supplier. 102 Under perfect competition on the supply side the price would equal marginal costs. Generally, a purchaser would not have an interest in extracting prices below marginal costs on a long-term basis since that would mean that no supplier could survive. An adequate or appropriate price would therefore have to be above marginal costs, but it would be impossible to define the extent to which the price must exceed this threshold. This problem is well known from the discussion of the iustum pretiumidea. From an economic perspective there is no such thing as a "just" or adequate/appropriate price that can be defined on its own terms. The same is true for the notion of "economic value" that was referred to by the ECJ in CICCE as a potentially relevant factor for determining an excessively low price under Art. 102 TFEU. 103 The economic value is not a fixed data but depends on the respective outside options available to the negotiating parties in the particular moment.
While the prevention of consumer harm can legitimately be considered as at least one of the goals of antitrust law, it would not be convincing to say the same about "supplier harm".
Awarding to each supplier an individual right to claim for prices above marginal costs would be antithetical to competition as an institution. 104 The process of competition is a model of selection between substitutes. 105 This assumption implies that customers are free to pay less than the seller of a certain good wants, and that if the parties do not agree upon a certain price, the customer has the freedom to refuse to purchase the good at all. Competition as a process requires the possibility that companies are excluded from the market and -ultimately -that markets may disappear as a whole if customers have found better substitutes for a particular 102 Rosch, supra note 55, at 14. However, the fact that there is no such thing as "supplier welfare" under the antitrust laws
should not mislead to the conclusion that the extraction of lower prices from suppliers through strong buyers were per se efficient, or at least neutral, with respect to social or consumer welfare. It was outlined above that price reductions initiated by a dominant purchaser via bilateral negotiations will generally not be detrimental to allocative efficiency or consumer welfare as long as they do not increase downstream monopolisation. Yet, such price cuts could lessen social welfare by reducing dynamic efficiency, namely result in a reduction in quality, in consumer choice, and in investment incentives for upstream suppliers.
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bb) Reduction of incentives for innovation
Price cuts reduce the sellers' income. While the antitrust laws do not protect any seller against losses in income, they have the purpose to protect competition as an institution by ensuring that dynamic efficiency is not hampered. A reduction in income might reduce dynamic efficiency and thereby social welfare: The reduction of income on the supply side can lessen the resources that are available for research and development. Very often, research and development are an important form of fixed cost leading to product differentiation in the input supply market. Consequently, buyer power might reduce product variety and technological progress. 111 That is a loss of consumer welfare. The EU Commission rightly states that consumer welfare "encompasses prices, diversity and quality." 112 negotiations between parties unless such terms would have negative effects on the competitive process and ultimately reduce consumer welfare."). 110 Grimes, supra note 1, at 569 (furthermore referring to an inefficient externalisation of a firm's costs to society). Price cuts initiated by a powerful buyer may reduce the incentives to engage in innovation.
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The extraction of a price reduction implies that the current price is above marginal costs.
Some even argue that the exertion of bargaining power presupposes that the supplier's upstream pricing is above the competitive level. 114 Otherwise there would be no rent that could be shifted to the powerful buyer as a result of the exertion of buyer power. The reason for such a rent being enjoyed by a supplier, though, can be successful innovation. Actually, the opportunity for a supplier to charge prices above the competitive level for at least a certain period is often a prerequisite for this undertaking to engage in innovation at all. Therefore, the anticipation of supracompetitive prices is an important element of dynamic competition.
Monopolistic prices are a spur to innovation, as the US Supreme Court has explicitly stated in "The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct."
That is the reason why patent law grants to the innovator exclusivity and therefore the possibility of monopolistic rents for a certain period of time. This opportunity to harvest the fruits of innovation can be restricted if the supplier faces the risk that the additional rents of innovation will be shifted to a powerful buyer. More recent work has shown that the negative effects of buyer power on the incentives for innovation can be even greater if powerful buyers, such as large retailers, enter into direct downstream competition with manufacturers in certain product segments. 120 The authors observe that large food retailers have increasingly taken over more of the functions in the vertical chain, such as distribution and marketing. Moreover, these retailers have stepped into direct competition by promoting so-called private labels that are offered as substitutes to the branded goods in supermarkets. The retailers have meanwhile even stepped into the upmarket segment with these products. In such a competitive environment the retailers become major innovators in the respective product segments. Under these preconditions their buyer power can further decrease incentives for innovations in the supply market, because it aggravates the above mentioned hold-up problem. If the purchaser starts with his own research and development activities ultimately leading to a direct competition with his supplier, there comes up a risk of copying and imitation. The suppliers can be afraid that their efforts will be exploited. The risk of such a hold-up effect and its intensity will depend on the size of the retailer in the subsequent downstream market. The larger the size is, the greater the incentive to undertake own private label production, because such activities will only be profitable if a sufficiently large number of units of these products can be distributed. 121 However, such negative effects on upstream innovation are not a per se consequence of buyer power. Rather, some authors have highlighted recently that buyer power can also create incentives to engage in upstream innovation. 122 It is argued that the suppliers faced less risks and uncertainty over the future demand where the buyer side is highly concentrated. 123 The risk of free rider behaviour is deemed to be lower with large buyers than with smaller ones. 124 This could give an incentive for innovation. Yet, this argument does not necessarily rule out any negative effect on innovation linked with buyer power. Firstly, the existence of a strong buyer will not always imply greater certainty for the supplier on the demand side. If the buyer has attractive outside options, the uncertainty might be significant. Secondly, the superior bargaining power of a strong buyer will nonetheless often result in a rent shifting to the detriment of the supplier, so that the return on innovation investments is negatively affected.
There is another argument that can be put forward for an innovation enhancing effect of buyer power. 125 It is based on the model of individual bilateral negotiations and refers to the importance of viable outside options. 126 Innovation on the supply side is assumed to render higher revenues in the future if compared to the hypothetical scenario without innovation.
Successful innovation is deemed to make a contract with the particularly innovative supplier more attractive for the powerful buyer and at the same time render the outside options available to him less attractive. In a model of bilateral negotiations this outcome can increase the bargaining power of the supplier, which will allow him to gain a larger share of the joint
profit. Yet, although this theory is intuitively plausible, this does not necessarily mean that such an effect will always offset any detriments that buyer power can have on the incentives to innovate. Even if successful innovation might increase bargaining power of the supplier vis-à-vis its powerful purchaser, the competitive scenario still implies the possibility that parts of the additional rents achieved through innovation might have to be transferred to the buyer.
The potential return on investments in research and development can therefore still be lower than it were in a competitive scenario without buyer power. Moreover, it must be considered that the seller might have other business activities concerning supply markets where dominant purchasers are absent. Any supplier will therefore compare potential revenues achievable through increased research and development efforts in those markets with the opportunities existing in the market where a powerful buyer is present. It is thus still possible, that superior bargaining power on the buyer side will gradually reduce the incentives for innovation.
However, it is also possible that innovation increases bargaining power of the supplier to such an extent, that a rent shifting to the benefit of the purchaser becomes unlikely or even takes place in the opposite direction. That could happen where the supplier creates a "must have"
innovative product that he could sell through multiple channels. The effects of buyer power on incentives to innovate therefore require a case by case analysis.
cc) Reduction of product variety
In addition to having negative effects on resources and incentives for research and consumers. 128 Multi-brand retailers often control access to the retail market as "gatekeepers". 129 The producer of a relevant input will seek to meet the special requirements of the particular strong buyer for him to have a chance on downstream product markets.
What is more, the exercise of buyer power can sustain a process of concentration on the supply side which ultimately can reduce product variety as well. 130 The more that rents are shifted from the supplier to the powerful purchaser, the greater the likelihood that suppliers will rather exit the market than reinvest. The remaining players on the supply side will finally gain market power and might ultimately form a monopoly vis-à-vis a powerful purchaser. The outcome would be a bilateral monopoly, 131 which is not a desirable competitive structure.
Although the supplier has now become an unavoidable training partner for the buyer so that the latter has an interest in keeping the former in business 132 and might not extract further price cuts, the monopolisation of the supply side reduces product variety and thereby negatively affects consumer welfare. 133 Besides these negative impacts on innovation, buyer power can also reduce further incentives for product differentiation. Large scale buyers might create efficiencies if they switch to a single sourcing strategy stocking goods from only one supplier or at least very few suppliers. 134 The suppliers will seek to meet the special product requirements of the powerful buyer so that they will be considered a viable outside option for the latter. Such a repositioning on the supply side can decrease product differentiation 135 in the long run.
c) An effects-based analysis of a reduction in dynamic efficiency
If one concludes that buyer power may harm dynamic efficiency by reducing incentives for innovation and product variety, this allows one to draw the following conclusions: Buyer power can be harmful even if superior bargaining power will not result in an exclusion of downstream rivals. This has relevance in cases where fierce downstream competition is at stake and where the downstream rivals might not be affected by upstream price discrimination since they have sources of supply in other geographical areas than the concentrated input demand market. Even in such a scenario, buyer power can harm social welfare by reducing dynamic efficiency. If this effect results in lower product quality or a decline in product variety, consumer welfare is negatively affected, too.
Thus, for a theory of harm in a merger context, it is not necessary to show that the increase in buyer power has lead to single-firm dominance (on the demand side). Rather, in a concentrated demand market each further increase of buyer power has to be controlled for the creation of such detrimental effects.
Moreover, the extraction of price reductions by a dominant firm can be abusive in terms of Article 102 Sentence 1 lit. a TFEU where such negative effects on dynamic efficiency and ultimately consumer welfare are demonstrated. This finding is a contradiction to the thesis that the payment of too low a price for an input by a dominant purchaser should only be considered abusive under Article 102 TFEU where it coincides with a reduction in demand/output. 137 However, since there is no such thing as "supplier harm" it cannot suffice for a breach of article 102 TFEU that buyer power is exerted as such. Rather, where downstream exclusion is not an issue, a reduction of suppliers' revenues should only be buyers would not chose the media which are optimal for the advertiser but those which offer the highest rebates. However, the Commission found no evidence that these potential quality problems would be created or increased as a result of the proposed transaction. Furthermore, the Commission was of the view that due to the increasing importance of media auditors, which many advertisers use to evaluate the media buying services provided by their agency, the quality of media buying could be controlled; Commission, Case COMP/M. with respect to the analysis of buyer power, only an effects based (or rule of reason) approach will be appropriate in the fields of merger control as well as in abuse of dominance cases.
Predatory buying
The observations that have been made with respect to exclusion and harm to social and consumer welfare finally allow to set the focus on a special type of exclusionary abuse/monopolization which is hard to put in a certain category. That is the so-called "predatory buying" theory of harm. It is the counterpart to predatory pricing, only that it takes place in a buyer market. Predatory buying means that a strong purchaser of a certain good pays prices higher than they would be under normal demand competition in order to tie the suppliers to him. This shall exclude its rivals in the demand market from access to this good.
In the first phase of such a predatory buying scheme the purchaser incurs losses through this overpayment. These losses have to be recouped in a second phase when the exclusion of rivals has resulted in a position of strength in the demand market. In this second recoupment phase the dominant purchaser will charge supracompetitively low prices from the suppliers. prove not only that the defendant caused the price to rise, but also that the defendant was likely to recoup the costs incurred in such a scheme during a subsequent recoupment phase. In fact, the Supreme Court applied a "buy-side version" of the monopoly predatory pricing test The search for an answer leads back into the heart of the discussion on the welfare effects of The answer should be positive if the powerful buyer reduces its output in phase 2 of the predatory buying strategy in order to reduce input prices. Yet, as was shown above, often the market mechanisms will not follow this model of single-price monopsony. Rather, contractual negotiations take place in bilateral relationships based on individual bargaining power. The powerful buyer will make "take it leave it offers" and aim to cut prices down without reducing purchase demand. This is especially likely where the powerful buyer faces severe downstream competition. 142 In such an environment, a predatory buying strategy might be successful in the input demand market by excluding demand rivals and ultimately succeed in reducing its input price, without any reduction of output and without downstream monopolisation. Moreover, fierce competition in the downstream market will force the powerful buyer to pass cost reductions on the consumers. Hence, no price increases in the downstream market will be an issue and losses to allocative efficiency are absent, too. Would predatory bidding nonetheless be considered anticompetitive? The US Supreme Court has not made a definitive statement on this question. While the Court has pointed out that predatory buying can do harm to suppliers even if consumer harm is not an issue 143 , it remains unclear 141 A reduction in input costs will not be passed on to consumers where the undertaking has oligopolistic or monopolistic power in the downstream market, see Grimes, supra note 1, at 576.
142 See Section II of this article. 143 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) ("In addition, predatory bidding presents less of a direct threat of consumer harm than predatory pricing. A predatory-pricing scheme ultimately achieves success by charging higher prices to consumers. By contrast, a predatory-bidding scheme could succeed with little or no effect on consumer prices because a predatory bidder does not necessarily rely on raising prices in the output market to recoup its losses. Salop 676. Even if output prices remain constant, a predatory bidder can use its power as the predominant buyer of inputs to force down input prices and capture monopsony profits.") (citing Steven C. whether this means any welfare losses are irrelevant for such a conduct to be found anticompetitive.
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Based on the conclusion drawn in the above sections, a differentiated approach must be appropriate. It was outlined that the mere reduction of prices can cause harm to dynamic efficiency and ultimately consumers as far as it reduces incentives for innovation and product differentiation. A predatory buying strategy is targeted at increasing bargaining power by excluding rivals in the demand market. This reduces outside options for the suppliers and provides the buyer with the opportunity to extract further price reductions. It is therefore persuasive to find predatory buying potentially anticompetitive even if downstream monopolisation is not a realistic threat. Again, this brings up the question for the legal standards for a breach of the law. Not the mere overpayment as such can suffice for the assumption that such harm will finally occur. Rather, it is necessary to develop a standard indicating that overpayment might cause these negative effects with some probability. This test must have two elements: (1) the probability of an increase in demand power in the input demand market, and (2) the probability that such an (assumed) increase in demand power will either likely exclude downstream rivals, and thereby increase monopolisation, or at least reduce incentives for innovation and product differentiation upstream, and thereby cause harm to dynamic efficiency.
As to the first question, the US Supreme Court has required in Weyerhaeuser a recoupment test to be fulfilled. It must be likely that the powerful buyer will make use of its increased bargaining power in phase 2 of his strategy to extract prices below the competitive level.
From the perspective of EU-competition law, however, there is no ground for such a requirement. The ECJ has decided in France Télécom with respect to predatory selling that no recoupment test is necessary. 145 This European jurisprudence is based on the assumption that for the integrity of the competitive order the mere attempt to predate must be condemned.
Therefore, for a predatory conduct to come under Article 102 TFEU, it is sufficient that the facts of the case indicate the mere potential for an exclusion to take place. The ECJ has developed the respective criteria in its AKZO-judgement, basically differentiating between prices below average total cost and average variable cost. 146 If one transfers the rationale behind the AKZO-jurisprudence, which concerned predatory selling, to predatory buying cases, the relevant question must be how to determine whether a price is so high that it can only be explained as being part of a predatory buying-strategy.
Academic literature has persuasively pointed out that it is hardly possible to describe the relevant threshold for the input-price by applying normative criteria such as "artificially"
high. Such terminology is rightly being criticised as "speculative at best". 147 The US Supreme dynamic efficiency. In that context, the same effects analysis must take place as was outlined above. On the other hand, a mere threat of "supplier harm" as a long term consequence 151 of a predatory bidding strategy should not be considered sufficient in itself to justify an intervention.
V. Conclusions
Buyer power is neither per se procompetitive nor is it per se anticompetitive. The effects depend on several factors. It is essential to distinguish between single price monopsony and bargaining power. While the former will reduce output and create a deadweight loss, this is not the case with demand-side bargaining power. The latter can serve as an instrument to exclude rivals from a downstream market. If a merger or exclusionary conduct gives rise to such effects, an intervention is justified. Yet, even in the absence of downstream monopolisation, an increase in buyer power can be objectionable. The key issues are potential negative effects on incentives for innovation and product variety which ultimately reduce dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare. The finding of such potentially harmful effects, though, requires an in depth effects analysis. Neither in the field of merger control nor with respect to Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Art. 102 TFEU will a form-based (or per se) approach address the issues linked to buyer power adequately.
